The Conflict in Iraq and its
Consequences on the Gulf
*PD Dr.
Henner Fürtig is Senior Research Fellow at the German
Institute for Middle East Studies in Hamburg (E-mail:
fuertig@doi.duei.de)
If a
circular model of the regional order in the Gulf is
imagined, the inner circle is shaped by a triangle of
states, i.e. Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Although the
balance within this triangular system is very fragile there
has been a proven method to uphold it. If one of the
mentioned countries gains too much weight, the other two
will try to compensate. This fundamental framework of the
region's balance of power has not changed basically since
the end of the Second World War with the minor exemption
that one has to add the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – in
strategic terms – to Saudi Arabia after 1981. Thus, in
general, whether conflict or cooperation prevailed between
certain regional countries was due to the actual state of
the overall balance of the triangular system. The following
analysis intends to address the question on whether the
U.S.-invasion of Iraq changed this traditional system.
1.
The triangle in operation
The 1960’s and the 1970’s present a graphic picture of the
triangle in operation when Imperial Iran and Saudi Arabia
were both allied to the US within the latter’s “Twin Pillars
strategy.” Tehran and Riyadh commonly provided a bulwark
against radical Iraqi nationalism and proto-socialism
supported by the Warsaw Pact. Considering the results of the
Twin Pillars policy in isolation, the downfall of the Shah
and the subsequent Islamic revolution in Iran would deem it
a complete disaster. In the end the policy was not able to
permanently secure the status quo in the region and to help
American interests. But if one examines only the last decade
of its existence, it must be recognized that it diminished
the huge potential for conflict in the Gulf region. (M.E.
Ahrari) “In the 1970’s there remained a tacit division of
labor, as it were, between Iran and Saudi Arabia, whereby
the former dominated the Gulf militarily, and the latter
dominated the economic affairs of OPEC.” The relationship
between Iran and Saudi Arabia was never to be as friendly
and fruitful as it was between 1968 and 1979: at the expense
of Iraq!
With Saddam Hussein assuming the presidency in 1979, Iraq
modified its policies remarkably. Saddam Hussein tried a new
tactic of softening his tone towards the Gulf monarchies,
weakening his ties with the Soviet Union and even
prosecuting Iraqi communists.
But these measures were not sufficient to destroy suspicion
amongst the monarchies of the Gulf. Only the outcome of the
Iranian revolution caused a change of attitude. Now the
Iranian foreign policy credo of exporting the revolution
(sudur-e enqelab) seemed much more dangerous than the
pan-Arabic maneuvers of Iraq which had been – more or less
successfully – contained during the past decade. Therefore,
the Al Saud were not objecting Saddam Hussein’s invasion of
Iran in September 1980 marking the start of the First Gulf
War. The Saudi leaning towards Iraq initiated the first
fundamental change in the triangle’s balance. For the next
decade Iraq became the main enemy of Iran within the region,
closely followed by Saudi Arabia who was the single most
important supporter of Iraq. The course of the war proved
that Saudi Arabia had “backed the winning horse.” Saddam
Hussein was successful in internationalizing the war and in
coercing Iran into the signing of a cease-fire in August
1988.
But now, Saddam Hussein was behaving like an undisputed
winner and flexing his muscles. The fragile, triangular
balance of power in the Gulf area was shaken again. The
Saudi government was therefore no longer interested in a
further weakening of Iran. Step by step King Fahd tried to
placate his Iranian neighbors to restore the balance of the
triangle. Too late, one could say. Less than two years after
the end of the First Gulf war, Iraq was invading Kuwait.
Information leaked in Baghdad that the Iraqi war machine
might not stop at the border to Saudi Arabia but might carry
the war deep into the oil province of al-Hasa. Iraq now
proved to be an even greater threat to Saudi Arabia than it
had been during the 1960s and 1970s. This U-turn in Iraq's
position in comparison to the First Gulf War promptly
resulted in a) a détente - although temporarily - between
Saudi Arabia and Iran and b) a remarkably closer security
cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. By offering
their soil for U.S. troops to push Saddam Hussein out of
Kuwait the Al Saud gained twofold: in the short run, the
Second Gulf war resulted in a almost total defeat of Saddam
Hussein, thus eliminating the immediate danger. In the long
run, nobody dared to attack Saudi Arabia when it had signed
a bulk of security agreements with the U.S.
2.
The triangle in dysfunction
The U.S.-invasion in Iraq and the subsequent ouster of
Saddam Hussein in April 2003, i.e. the Third Gulf War,
stands in sharp contrast to the previous two Gulf wars.
Whereas the former only modified respectively changed the
triangular system of power in the Gulf region, the latter
put this specific power system into question at all. The
fact that an external actor, namely the U.S. initiated this
political earthquake aggravated the crisis undoubtedly. By
occupying Iraq and crushing the Baath-created state
structure, the U.S. virtually replaced Iraq as a regional
actor without completely substituting the vacant position.
As the only superpower at the beginning of the 21st.
century, the U.S. would under no circumstances be able to
limit itself on regional politics. It is first and foremost
a global player. It will definitely take time until a new
Iraqi government can take over its part in regional politics
– if that will happen at all.
The fundamental weakening of Iraq must have had far-reaching
repercussions for the other two “corners” of the triangle.
One consequence is obvious for both Iran and Saudi-Arabia.
The “eternal” threat embodied by the Iraqi nationalist Baath
regime in general, and Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in
particular has vanished. No more Iraqi army with 400.000
men, Scud missiles, chemical weapons and repeatedly proven
expansionists drive. There is even no certainty whether
Iraqi military power will rise again at all. Due to the
mechanisms of upholding the balance in the triangular system
elaborated earlier, one could anticipate that the remaining
two actors would benefit now at the expense of Iraq. Yes,
they do but this is only one side of the coin.
With regard to the internal players of the region, the
external actor reduced the traditional triangular system to
– or respectively replaced it by – a balance-shaped system
constituted by Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both countries don’t
have any experience whatsoever in dealing with such a
system. In no way it is a prolongation or revival of the old
“Twin Pillars” coalition that was basically defined by
common interests vis-à-vis a third party. And the new system
seems even not to be in a balance. In mere figures it
obviously favors Iran. Although Saudi Arabia is 1.3 times
the size of Iran geographically, it has a fundamentally
smaller population. At the beginning of the 21st.
century there were about 73 million Iranians in contrast to
not more than 23 million inhabitants in Saudi Arabia. Of
course, the demographic imbalance between both states
influenced their respective military strength. Although the
Saudi Arabian government has always tried to compensate for
low manpower levels in its different military branches by
purchasing the most sophisticated military hardware
available, this was not sufficient to outmaneuver the
Iranians. The discrepancy has remained to the present. Thus,
at a first glimpse, with its victory over Iraq in the Third
Gulf War the U.S. has indeed destroyed Iran’s and
Saudi-Arabia’s archenemy but made Saudi Arabia more
vulnerable simultaneously.
The fact
that fifteen of the nineteen 9/11-terrorists were possessing
Saudi passports shocked the American public. The emerging
“anti-Saudi” atmosphere also affected the Administration. In
November 2003, a group of senators presented the “Saudi
Arabia Accountability Act”. The Act entailed imposing
military and diplomatic sanctions on Saudi Arabia for
allegedly failing “to halt Saudi support for institutions
that fund, train, incite, encourage, or in any way aid and
abate terrorism.”
The U.S.
did not opt for the fall of the House of Sa‘ud. It wanted a
fundamental change in Saudi behavior. And in this regard,
Washington became impatient. When President Bush asked for
“political reforms” in Saudi Arabia still in more nebulous
phrases, he used much more concrete words when demanding a
promise by the Al Sa‘ud to eliminate all forms of support to
al-Qaida and Islamic terrorism. The demands were accompanied
by requests to control, respectively to clamp down on
financial and welfare organizations believed to be –
voluntarily or not – channels of support for worldwide
Islamic terrorism. The Al Sa‘ud, fully aware of the danger
to loose US support, assured its continuation by
clandestinely supporting the war in Iraq. Under the
condition that the aircrafts did not fly direct sorties
against Iraq, they allowed a gradual expansion of the U.S.
Air Force presence at the Sultan air base. They opened some
additional facilities in the north of the country to Special
Forces operations in support of the invasion. And they did
not restrict the use of the original Southern Watch
operation conducted out of Al Kharj in support of bombing
runs over Iraq. They allowed tankers and refueling and other
logistical assistance to go forward. In short, virtually
every request made by the U.S. administration for military
or logistical support was met positively. Two main reasons
led to this behavior. Firstly, continuing security
dependency and secondly, Saudi Arabia wanted to remain a
player in the game when the fate of its northern neighbor
would be decided upon.
Although
Saudi Arabia was altogether very much interested in a
weakening of its long-time rival in the Gulf, it was equally
intense interested in securing the territorial and political
integrity of Iraq. With Sunni Wahhabism as a kind of state
religion, Riyadh’s
preference has always been a Sunni Muslim establishment
firmly in power in Iraq. But Arab Sunnis are a
minority in Iraq, and are fighting an uphill struggle since
April 2003. Therefore, should Iraq really fragment into
civil war, the Saudi ruling family would support the Sunni
factions in Iraq. But in this case,
Iraq’s disintegration would
seem unavoidable. And this would extend Kurdish, Iranian,
and Turkish influence, all of which Riyadh opposes. The
reason behind this deep concern is not Iraq’s disintegration
as such, but its repercussions at Saudi Arabia.
Iraq’s fragmentation will
affect the already fragile Saudi national identity. Tribal,
sectarian, and regional antagonisms would be fuelled. Thus,
since the disintegration of Iraq is one of the worst
scenarios for the Al Sa‘ud, it is one of al-Qaida’s most
urgent desires conversely. Even if a fragmentation of Iraq
can be avoided, the dangerous situation for Saudi Arabia
will continue. A united and centrally governed Iraq will –
under the prevailing circumstances – be a country where the
Shiites will have a dominant, or at least a leading
position. The Shia world community is only about 15%
of all Muslims, but 65% in Iraq, 90% in Iran, 60% in
Bahrain, and some 50% in the Eastern oil province of Saudi
Arabia. Therefore, the Shiites became a powerful force under
the new conditions; they represent the majority population
in the Gulf. The Shi’a could awake to the geographical
accident that has placed the world’s major oil supplies in
areas where they form the majority: Iran, Bahrain, the
Eastern province of Saudi-Arabia and southern Iraq – a
powerful ‘Commonwealth of “Petrolistan”.
If the Shiites in Saudi
Arabia rose with the backing of both Iran and the
Shiite-dominated Iraq, the Al Sa‘ud would get in serious
troubles.
But
fortunately for the Al Saud, the more the Americans are
focused on crisis management in Iraq, the more they will be
ready to talk on a “discount” in any future deals. In the
light of the mounting problems in Iraq, Washington wants to
prevent Saudi Arabia descending into chaos and anarchy.
Therefore, Washington’s pressure for reform has diminished.
Although the political class of the U.S. no longer trusts
the Al Sa‘ud, it will
continue to support them. When King Abdallah met President
Bush in Crawford, Texas, in April 2005, both leaders were at
pains to stress the warmth of their personal relationship,
as well as that between the two countries. So far, the Saudi
rulers are still sure that they are too important to the
U.S. to remain undefended in a major crisis. This is not
much for a rich country and a proud ruling family that were
an equal and independent player in a working triangular
regional system only five years ago. An Iraq in turmoil, an
Iran that is not sure on whether to rejoice on the victory,
or to deplore the defeat in the Third Gulf War, and a Saudi
Arabia in confusion have buried the traditional triangular
system.
3.
Conclusions
Any
analysis of the Iraq War’s results for the Gulf region comes
back to a renewed elaboration of the consequences the war
had for the traditional triangular system. Did a new system
emerge, will it emerge, or will the triangle get a re-birth?
At all events, the permanent U.S. presence in the Gulf
created an entirely new environment where previous security
structures and approaches became obsolete. The first
impression suggests a quadratic system now. It seems as if
the U.S. presence added a new corner to the model, and
transformed the triangle into a square. But in reality the
impression does not fit because it supposes an independent
Iraq, articulating and pursuing own national interests.
Under the prevailing circumstances, the U.S. in this regard
usurps Iraq’s role: as mentioned earlier. Thus, the
continuing military presence of the U.S. in Iraq, and the
uncertainty, if Iraq will preserve its integrity and will
ever regain complete sovereignty created a new, artificial
triangle comprised of the U.S., Iran and Saudi Arabia/GCC.
Even the
old two-against-one formula was reanimated in the artificial
triangle. In spite of the mentioned quarrels between
Washington and Riyadh after 9/11, the security cooperation –
or better the dependency of the latter from the former –
increased. And both the U.S. and the GCC/Saudi Arabia have a
vivid interest in containing Iran. For its part, Iran would
find itself on the margins of this imposed structure:
unbearable in a region that it regards to be so important to
its prosperity. Isn’t the
siege of Iran by the United States, its (semi)protectorate
Iraq, and the – more or less pro-American – GCC countries
suggesting the replacement of the earlier quadratic, than
triangular by a now bilateral system? Strangely enough,
external or at least non-Arab powers, i.e. the U.S. and
Iran, are now the most powerful actors in the otherwise Arab
Gulf region. This situation is at least as artificial as the
U.S. being part of the specific triangular structure after
the Iraq War.
Thus, after elaborating on
the different models of security structures in the Gulf
area, the solution to the grave problems does not seem to
lie in a complete replacement of the old triangular system.
History, tradition, and geography, are among the many
factors that favor the persistence of the system’s specific
shape. What should be changed instead is the notorious “two
against the third”-formula. It should be replaced by a
triangle that is outbalanced and in harmony.
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